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FOCUSED DISCUSSION PEER-REVIEWED
People as Scientific Instruments∗
Maarten Derksen†
People are common instruments in the social sciences. They may
act as experimenters, receiving and instructing the participants;
they may be stooges, confederates of the experimenter who are
part of the experimental manipulation; they may function as raters
of their own personalities or those of others; or they may conduct
interviews and do observations. In most social scientific research,
people are necessary to elicit, record, or measure the phenomena
under study. They are an essential instrument in most social
science.
I want to point out a recurrent feature of human instruments in social
science: their instrumentality is hidden in order to be effective. I argue
that the machinations of human instruments assert at the same time the
manipulability of people and their recalcitrance, construct them as both
predictable, natural objects and free, autonomous subjects. This requires,
I argue in conclusion, an amendment of Latour’s influential approach to
the study of technology.
I. HUMAN INSTRUMENTS
There is surprisingly little literature on human instruments in the
social sciences. As a case in point, two recent overviews of instruments
in psychology do not include human beings. Horst Gundlach limits
his extensive discussion of psychological instruments to “inorganic
instruments,” “for the sake of brevity,” although he does acknowledge
that “it is certainly correct to say that some psychological research does
use humans as means” (Gundlach 2007, 205; emphasis in the original).
Thomas Sturm and Mitchell Ash do not consider people at all in their
otherwise excellent exploration and analysis of the roles of instruments
in psychological research (Sturm and Ash 2005). Their definition of a
psychological instrument, although “deliberately broad” (2005, 15), covers
material devices and objects as well as abstract analytical methods, but
not human beings. Speaking of ancient and medieval studies of the moon
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illusion, Sturm and Ash note “There are no instruments here, unless one
takes the human eye to be an instrument” (2005, 10). Their reticence–to
consider the human eye a scientific instrument would apparently be a step
too far–contrasts with the enthusiasm with which many scientists have
used themselves instrumentally in their own research. Leaving aside the
natural sciences,1 the early history of experimental psychology provides a
good example.
Human instruments were essential in the “New Psychology” introduced
by Wilhelm Wundt, as it relied heavily on introspection. Deborah Coon
has analysed the way early experimental psychologists attempted not only
to standardize introspection, but “even to ’standardize’ the experimental
human subject as an introspecting instrument” (Coon 1993, 759). The
“observer,” as the person providing the data was called, was considered
to be a scientific instrument no less than the brass laboratory apparatus
surrounding him, and ideally would virtually be a machine. Similarly,
Ruth Benschop and Douwe Draaisma showed that Wundtian psychology
demanded not only the calibration of the material technology of experiment
(notably its chronometric arsenal), but also of the “social technology” of
the people involved in the experiment (Benschop and Draaisma 2000).
The introspective method did not survive the ascent of behaviorism,
which replaced the machine-like observer with the laboratory animal, and
severed the problematic link between the object experimented on and the
subject that registered the results.2 Traces of introspectionism do remain,
however. Survey research is based on the fundamental assumption that
“respondents can give valid reports of their own subjective states” (Martin,
quoted by Strack and Schwarz 2007, 228).
If we, as a first approximation, divide scientific instruments into those
that produce phenomena, and those that register them, we can find
numerous examples of both in the social sciences. The interviewer3
elicits responses; the stooge or confederate is part of the experimental
manipulation; and the rater in a content analysis produces numerical data
from text. Each is indispensable in the production or registration of the
1 But see Schaffer (1992; 1988) for natural philosophers and astronomers using their
own bodies or those of their assistants as instruments, and Raj (2007, chapter 6) for
British explorers using “Pundits” as human instruments in the geographical survey of
the Transhimalaya.
2 The technoscientific ideal remained. To behaviorists, their rats and pigeons were
machines that modeled the mechanisms of psychological phenomena (a case of
“mechanicotheriomorphism,” according to Stam and Kalmanovitch [1998]).
3 Sturm and Ash (2005, 12-14) do discuss the interview, but as a tool used by the
interviewer. That mixes up the interview with the questionnaire. The interviewer and
the interview are inseparable.
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phenomena of interest in their respective kinds of social science. If we
go beyond the distinction of producing and registering, we may include
the experimenter, who is instrumental in preparing the specimen. The
experimenter guides the transformation of a volunteer into a “subject”
by procuring informed consent and giving instructions and reassurances.
Often the experimenter’s role extends to manipulating the beliefs of the
subject by giving false or incomplete information about the goal of the
experiment, or by giving false feedback during the experiment. In other
words, preparation can be continuous with manipulation of the subject.
II. UNOBTRUSIVE MANIPULATION
My aim here is not to draw up an inventory of human instruments in
the social sciences, but to explore the significance of a feature that is
shared by many: the fact that their instrumentality is more or less hidden.
Javier Lezaun’s analysis of the focus group offers a good example of
masked instrumentality (Lezaun 2007). The focus group is a scientific
technology to elicit individual opinions, of a new consumer product for
instance, by encouraging a conversation among a small group of people
in a structured setting. Central in this technological assemblage is the
moderator, who must manage the process in such a way that it produces
a maximum number of authentic opinions from all group members. A
central concern of the moderator is the tension between artificiality and
naturalness. The artificiality of the focus group situation, embodied in the
presence of the moderator, must engender a natural conversation in which
authentic opinions are spontaneously expressed. Thus, “the fundamental
problem for moderators is how to turn the research subjects away from the
experimental features of the setting” (2007, 136). The participants are, of
course, aware that they are there for a reason, they try to figure out what
it is, and they often either resist it or try to be helpful, neither of which
produces authentic opinions. The moderator must carefully manage the
group to express “non-directive” opinions, but must do so without drawing
attention to his tactics, “Non-direction needs to be actively engineered
into the behaviour of the moderator and into the responses he elicits
from the research subjects” (2007, 138). “The goal of the moderator is to
benevolently (forcefully, yet imperceptibly) lead the focus group to a useful
outcome (of which their subjects are ignorant)” (2007, 141).
Unobtrusive manipulation is also a part of many other social scientific
methods, such as psychological testing (Derksen 2001). In psychological
research it is standard procedure not to tell the participants what
hypothesis is being tested, deceiving them instead with a cover story.
Social psychologists in particular almost universally agree that subjects
who know what the researcher wants to know do not produce good data.
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Their behavior is calculated rather than spontaneous and authentic–a
reaction to the social situation of the experiment, rather than to the
experiment as social situation. Eliciting authentic behavior in the artificial
environment of the laboratory requires subtle machinations–forceful,
yet imperceptible–to create “illusions of reality” (Korn 1997). Social
psychology has a history of elaborate experimental set-ups, often
composed of multiple layers of deception. In Stanley Milgram’s famous
obedience experiments, the experimenter was in fact a schoolteacher
with a stern appearance and impassive manner, and the stooge who
supposedly received the shocks a mild-mannered accountant; the shock
machine had been meticulously constructed by Milgram himself. Korn
refers to the 1960s and 1970s as the “stage production era” of social
psychology (Korn 1997, 113), and although the reliance on deception has
diminished somewhat since then, the first thing that first-year psychology
students (the subjects in most psychological research) learn is that in
psychological experiments, nothing is what it seems.
III. FREEDOM AND MECHANISM
Focus groups and social psychological experiments illustrate a
recurring feature of social science: human instruments tend to be
deceptive, and their machinations veiled. Manipulation and deception in
social science are not uncontested. Milgram’s studies for example led to
a heated discussion on the ethics of experimental deception (Baumrind
1964; Milgram 1964), a discussion that inaugurated a wider ethical debate
in psychology that only abated in the 1970s. It has recently been revived by
experimental economists, who contend that deception in social science is
often unnecessary and counterproductive (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001;
2008a; 2008b). They resent the “contamination” of the subject pool
by (social) psychologists, whose deceptive practices make prospective
participants distrustful, suspicious, and less willing to act as subjects. In
experimental economy deception is proscribed, yet researchers are able
to perform experiments in which subjects are not lied to. Typically, such
experiments set up games between participants, and the strategies they
deploy form the data. Experimental economics, however, is not free of
machinations: Hertwig and Ortmann are careful to define deception as
explicit, intentional lying, allowing the “withholding of information about
research hypotheses, the range of experimental manipulations or the
like” (Hertwig and Ortmann 2008b, 222). Note also that experimental
control remains the goal: the problem with deception is that it breeds
suspicion, and suspicious subjects may distort their behavior in ways
that the experimenter does not control (an argument originally advanced
in Kelman 1967). Only a minority of social scientists reject manipulation
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and deception altogether, among them social constructionists like Kenneth
Gergen, who see research as a collaborative exploration of possibilities,
more like a dance than a contest of strength (Gergen 2009).
Hertwig and Ortmann’s criticism points to an important aspect of the
manipulative kind of social science: the human subject appears as both
an instrument and a free agent. Manipulation must be hidden because
the subject will resist it otherwise–Hertwig and Ortmann believe it does
not remain hidden, and resistance will therefore grow among subjects.
Machinations such as the ones described above are the middle term that
links two seemingly incompatible metaphysical domains: that of nature
and that of freedom. Hidden instrumentality coaxes free persons to follow
the will of another, and allows human nature to express itself in artificial
conditions. The products of this kind of social science include, on the one
hand, new types of machinations, and, on the other hand, strategies for
bringing them to light, resisting them or turning them to one’s advantage
(Coon 1992; Pettit 2007). B.F. Skinner’s behavior analysis, for instance,
came with a philosophy that did away with freedom altogether, and
employed a fully mechanistic theory of human behavior in its interventions,
such as the token economy. In practice, however, behavior analysts
quickly learnt that “behavioral engineering” was accepted more easily if
it wasn’t linked to Skinner’s radical materialist philosophy, and behavior
analysis became the principle behind self-help regimes that promised
empowerment and self-control (Baistow 2001; Rutherford 2009).
IV. MACHINES AND MACHINATIONS
In his paper “The Prince for machines as well as for machinations,”
Bruno Latour first introduced his influential argument that our modern
society is held together to a large extent by machines (Latour 1988).
Whereas the Princes of Machiavelli’s days could rely only on machinations
that exploited human passions, thus making them dependent on the
fickleness of people, nowadays one can tie together people with the sturdy
bonds of material technology. “(H)ow much cleverer it is to bind together
men, these wretched creatures that are always ready to break their
contracts and go to [...] competitors, by wires, meters, copper, and filament
lamps” (Latour 1988, 26-27). One cannot understand current society
without considering these “missing masses” (Latour 1992). Latour’s point
was not that machinations have become irrelevant–it is the weaving
together of increasing numbers of non-human machines with human
machinations that characterizes our collectives. In practice, however,
Latour’s influential philosophy of technology has inspired many studies
of material technology, but few of machinations. I believe a closer look
at people as instruments in social science prompts an amendment of
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two elements of Latour’s view of technology, and a route for its further
elaboration.
In all his texts on technology and society, Latour argues that social
relations lack solidity and permanence without the cement of material
technology. People are prey to unpredictable passions and whims; purely
human bonds are soft. Without material tools, our society would be as
volatile as that of baboons, who need to re-establish the social order
each morning. “It is always ‘things’–and I now mean this last word
literally–which, in practice, lend their ‘steely’ quality to the hapless ‘society’”
(Latour 2005, 68). This claim ignores the extent to which the fickleness of
people is the object of intense social scientific work, rather than being the
uncontested, established fact that Latour (curiously, given his approach to
facts) takes it for. The point of social science in the manipulative paradigm
is to establish to what extent and under what circumstances human actions
are predictable. The success of such research is often limited, but in
general it contradicts the idea of unpredictability as a fundamental trait
of people.
A second element of Latour’s argument that requires another look
is his suggestion that material tools have become the main source of
social change. Applied to the social sciences, we may note that material
technology indeed plays an important role in innovating procedures and
producing new phenomena. An example is the Implicit Association Test
(IAT), an instrument that has recently created much excitement among
psychologists. The test requires a computer running the appropriate
software, and the phenomenon it produces and measures–small
differences in reaction time sorting pairs of concepts printed on the
screen–would not exist without it. The IAT has made a formerly shadowy
psychological variable, unconscious attitudes, producible and measurable.
Unconscious attitudes can now become a reliable part of the machinations
of marketing and advertising, to name but one area of application. Thus,
the IAT is a good example of the weaving together of human and
non-human technologies that Latour sees as characteristic of Modernity.
However, the IAT not only produces reliable responses, but also raises
the issue of human recalcitrance. Unlike other psychological tests, at least
one version of the IAT is freely accessible,4 and this has prompted doubts
about its reliability: a subject who realizes how the test works can resist
it and produce a calculated, “inauthentic” result (Verschuere, Prati, and
Houwer 2009). Some who study unconscious determinants of behavior
explicitly aim to further such resistance, for instance aiding “consumers in
controlling and improving their decisions” (Chartrand 2005, 209). Latour’s
4 implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/
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focus on material technology as the engine of social change should
therefore be broadened to include the contrary assertion of human control
it may give rise to. Devices may be crucial in innovations such as the IAT,
but resistance and the exercise of freedom are part of the social change
they foster.
My point is not that attempts to instrumentalize human relations will
always flounder on the essential freedom of the subject, or some similar
humanist position. A consideration of people as instruments in social
science rather suggests a study of human instrumentality and resistance
as simultaneous creations, articulated in relation to each other. The
focus on the weaving together of human and non-human tools that has
become so dominant in social theory recently, needs to be broadened to
include the relation between human predictability and recalcitrance, and
the negotiation of the two in veiled machinations.
MAARTEN DERKSEN
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